HISTORIC AND CONTEMPORARY CLIMATE SURROUNDING IMMIGRATION
Immigration has been a topic of great public interest for virtually the entire history of the United States. In April 2006, during yet another uptick in public discussion, the Atlantic Monthly termed immigration "The Perpetual Controversy" and reprinted portions of articles on the topic dating to 1896. n11 The content of the historical articles demonstrated that the issues surrounding immigration had changed little in more than 100 years. A June 1896 Atlantic article, for example, discussed how many individuals from outside the United States should be allowed to enter each year, how then-existing immigration laws should be enforced, whether Congress needed to make changes to immigration statutes and regulations, what the writer described as the threat posed by immigration to "the American rate of wages, the American standard of living, and the quality of American citizenship," and similar topics. n12 Atlantic articles in subsequent years "defend[ed] newcomers against ... blatant discrimination" n13 and argued "that immigrants are probably more of a boon to this country than a burden." n14
In contemporary American society, even as Congress adopts costly measures that attempt to restrict the passage of undocumented immigrants through the U.S.-Mexican border, n15 immigrants may be [*283] more prevalent in more communities than at virtually any other time in recent history. For example, The New York Times reported in August 2006 that new data from the U.S. Census Bureau showed that " [t] he number of immigrants living in American households rose 16% over the last five years, fueled largely by recent arrivals from Mexico [.] " n16 The same Census Bureau data also demonstrated that immigrants continued to be found in large numbers in traditionally immigrant-rich states including New York, California, Texas, Florida, New Jersey and Illinois. Significantly, however, other states, including Indiana, South Dakota, Delaware, Missouri, Colorado and New Hampshire, saw their immigrant populations increase more than 25% in just five years. n17 Recently U.S. journalists have reported not only on the increasing presence of immigrants in the United States but also the increasing strains being placed on the U.S. government's administrative law system charged with interpreting and applying immigration laws. For example, The New York Times reported in August 2006 that the country's 200-plus immigration judges, who are not members of the federal judiciary but rather administrative law judges employed by the U.S. Justice Department, were warned by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales that they would face new performance reviews in the wake of allegations that some judges browbeat, bullied and otherwise mistreated immigrants and their lawyers. n18 In early 2006, Gonzales ordered a comprehensive review of the immigration court system after several Article III judges on the courts of appeal--charged by statute with hearing immigration appeals from the administrative law system--complained that some immigration judges were "biased and incoherent [,] " particularly with respect to decisions on applications for asylum. n19 The asylum issue, in particular, recently has attracted notable and widespread attention. n20 The New York Times, once again, reported in [*284] mid-2006 that two recent studies had independently concluded that the system for processing asylum claims was, in essence, broken. n21 First, researchers from Syracuse University studied nearly 300,000 immigration cases from 1994 to 2005. n22 The Syracuse study demonstrated great disparities in treatment of asylum applications. One immigration judge in Miami, for example, denied nearly 97% of asylum applications in which the petitioner had a lawyer, but an immigration judge in New York granted asylum in approximately 90% of similar cases. n23 Meanwhile, a second study, conducted by the congressionally mandated U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, confirmed disparities in treatment of asylum cases, concluding also that asylum seekers with lawyers were substantially more likely to be successful than those without lawyers. n24 Such uneven treatment individual cases led one federal circuit judge, in particular, to severely criticize the administrative handling of asylum adjudications. In a published judicial opinion widely quoted by other judges and in subsequent news articles, Judge Richard Posner of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit wrote in November 2005 that "the adjudication of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of legal justice." n25 Judge Posner wrote that the Seventh Circuit had reversed administrative decisions in 40% of recent immigration appeals and had been obligated to engage in frequent and severe criticism of the immigration law courts for significant mistakes, unsupported or unexplained conclusions, disparaging remarks, personal bias, and a raft of other [*286] These changes have added to the difficulty of asylum seekers, who already operated in an environment seemingly geared against them. First, asylum determinations involve some degree of discretion on the part of the designees of the Attorney General or Secretary of Homeland Security. n33 Second, even a successful asylum applicant is not guaranteed permission to remain in the United States permanently, as Congress has authorized the Attorney General to revoke asylum status if the Attorney General determines that conditions have changed such that the refugee no longer meets the requirements. n34 Third, multiple circumstances automatically disqualify one from gaining asylum. n35 Finally, and most importantly, the asylum seeker bears the burden to establish that he or she is unable or unwilling to return to his or her home country because of past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution "on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." n36
The determination of whether one has a well-founded fear of persecution involves both a subjective component and an objective component. n37 In other words, the applicant must demonstrate not only that he or she has been persecuted or "actually fears persecution" but also that "a reasonable person in the applicant's position would ... fear persecution ... on account of one of the five grounds." n38 The subjective determination hinges on whether the applicant's story is deemed credible and whether the applicant produces corroborating documents or testimony, while the objective component largely hinges on the content of the U.S. State Department's Country Report n39 [*287] for the country in question. An applicant who demonstrates past persecution is entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. n40 A "well-founded fear" has been described as a "reasonable possibility" that is something less than a preponderance of the evidence. n41 An asylum application may arise affirmatively, n42 meaning a refugee from another country who is present in the United States files the application before he or she has come to the attention of U.S. immigration authorities, or the application may arise defensively, n43 [*288] meaning the applicant already has been charged with removability (formerly called deportation) and raises asylum as a defense. n44 In either case, the application is made on a form provided by CIS, and the central component of the application form is the applicant's own narrative declaration of the grounds for his or her asylum claim. n45 Interestingly, Question 3A in Part B of the application form asks the asylum applicant whether he or she, or any family members, have ever "belonged to or been associated with ... the press or media [.] " n46 In affirmative applications, the applicant will undergo an interview by an asylum officer. If the application is not approved at this administrative level, it will be referred to the Immigration Court. n47
Page 4 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 279, *284 The Immigration Court and immigration judges are not part of the judiciary as established in Article III of the Constitution. Instead, the immigration judges are administrative law judges within the U.S. Department of Justice's Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR). Before the immigration judge, the applicant may be represented by legal counsel and may submit additional documentation, including photographs, affidavits from corroborating witnesses and expert statements, among others. Eventually, the applicant will appear for a hearing before the IJ, and the critical factor for the IJ will be whether the judge determines the applicant to be credible. n48 If the [*289] IJ does not grant the asylum application, the applicant may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, another Justice Department entity. Generally, counsel will prepare a brief to be filed before the BIA, which may affirm or reverse the decision of the IJ.
If the applicant does not prevail at the BIA, he or she may file an appeal in the U.S. Court of Appeals corresponding to the location in which the applicant lives. Given the discretionary nature of the administrative decision whether to grant asylum, Congress limited the ability of the Courts of Appeal to review asylum cases. In order to reverse a decision of the BIA, the Court of Appeals must find that the BIA abused its discretion--a high standard for the immigrant to meet. n49
SCHOLARLY DISCCUSSION OF "PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP"
Approximately 190 million people, or 3% of the world's population, were classified as migrants in 2005, according to the United Nations. n50 Of those, approximately 8.4 million people were determined to be refugees n51 by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. n52 The United States is the number one resettler of refugees in the world, having resettled more than 52,000 refugees in 2004, for example. n53 However, only about one in five U.S. asylum applicants n54 is successful in gaining asylum--about 25,000 to 30,000 successful asylum applicants per year. n55 In cases decided by Immigration Judges, individuals from China made up the largest group (22%) of asylum seekers, while the second-and third-largest groups came from Haiti [*290] and Colombia, respectively (about 9% each). n56 The next-largest groups of U.S. asylum seekers came from, in descending order, Albania, India, Guatemala, El Salvador, Russia, Mexico and Pakistan. n57 Researchers have found that several factors impact an asylum seeker's likelihood of success. Applicants represented by lawyers, for example, achieve asylum about 36% of the time, while those without legal representation are successful only about 7% of the time. n58 Likelihood of success also hinges on the country of nationality, with 80% of recent asylum seekers from El Salvador, Mexico and Haiti being denied while 70% of recent applicants from Burma and Afghanistan were approved. n59 The chance of success also may depend greatly on the individual immigration judge to whom an applicant's case is assigned. n60
Several scholars have recognized the importance of the definition of a "particular social group" but little or no research has focused on the term as applied to journalists. n61 The discussion and conclusions of scholars on whether certain other groups might fall within this definition will provide context for exploration of whether the term applies to journalists.
As an initial matter, academic writers have discussed who should be allowed to make the determination of what constitutes a "particular social group." While U.S. immigration officials and judges have tended to apply their own definition of the term, one writer argued that U.S. executive and judicial branch officers should defer to the subjective experiences and viewpoints of those applying for asylum. n62 This view would de-emphasize the perceptions of persecutors and even U.S. immigration authorities and jurists, whom the writer called "secondary oppressors," and restore the ability of individuals, at least in gender-based asylum claims, to define themselves. n63
[*291] Several writers have documented cases in which IJs, the BIA and even the U.S. Courts of Appeal determined that certain individuals were entitled to asylum based on persecution for being members of the particular social group of gays and the transgendered. n64 Two scholars argued that persons with physical disabilities constituted a particular social group for asylum purposes under the INA. n65 Meanwhile, another commentator recommended Page 5 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 279, *288 expanding the definition of who could qualify for asylum to include individuals caught up in generalized political violence even though they may not have personally advocated a particular political point of view within the larger conflict. n66
Still another author contended that Bosnian women who were raped by Serbs in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s constituted a particular social group. n67 Similarly, commentators have debated whether asylum protection should be extended, under the "particular social group" language, to individuals subjected to involuntary medical intervention such as electroshock therapy for gays; n68 to women subjected to forcible polygamy, female genital mutilation, abuse and other mistreatment because of their gender; n69 to children exploited for prostitution and labor; n70 to the mentally disabled; n71 to [*292] conscientious objectors; n72 and to victims of forced impregnation, abortion or sterilization. 
JUDICIAL DEFINITIONS OF "PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP"
Notwithstanding its importance, the term "particular social group" remains largely undefined. Congress has chosen not to define the term in the U.S. Code, and the executive branch immigration agencies likewise have not exercised their prerogative to define it in the Code of Federal Regulations. U.S. courts largely have struggled with the definition of the term, n74 but some intrepid judges have attempted to outline its parameters. In the 1986 case Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, n75 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit examined relevant international materials n76 on determining the status of refugees and reached the following definition:
[T]he phrase "particular social group" implies a collection of people closely affiliated with each other, who are actuated by some common impulse or interest. Of central concern is the existence of a voluntary associational relationship among the purported members, which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity as a member of that discrete social group. n77
The court went on to consider two hypothetical examples. An immediate family, in the court's view, might constitute a particular social group under the INA because the family is "a focus of fundamental [*293] affiliational concerns and common interests for most people" and is "a small, readily identifiable group." n78 On the other hand, the court reasoned, a "statistical group" such as "males taller than six feet" would not likely constitute a particular social group as that term is defined in the INA, presumably because the group would be too large and the common characteristics of members of the group would not relate to the reason for persecution. n79 Applying these principles to the facts at hand, the court concluded that a group of "young, working class, urban males of military age" did not constitute a particular social group for purposes of the INA because such a category was too sweeping in that members had "a plethora of different lifestyles, varying interests, diverse cultures, and contrary political leanings." n80 Thus, the court agreed with the IJ, who had reasoned "that to recognize any person who might conceivably establish that he was a member of this class is entitled to asylum or withholding of deportation would render the definition of 'refugee' meaningless." n81 Several other circuits have cited the Ninth's Sanchez-Trujillo case and added bits and pieces to the definition of "particular social group." For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit referred to the Sanchez-Trujillo definition and then elaborated that "[a] particular social group is comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor--or in the eyes of the outside world in general." n82 The court further clarified that, like persecution on account of race, religion, nationality and political opinion, persecution on the basis of membership in a particular social group must relate to a group characteristic that is "recognizable and discrete." n83
Meanwhile, four other circuits staked out a definition that focuses on "characteristics that are essentially beyond the [asylum seeker's] power to change." n84 Under this definition, membership in a particular social group hinges on whether one shares common characteristics that are "beyond the power of an individual to change or [are] so Prior to Matter of Acosta, the BIA had been hesitant to endorse any detailed definition of the term "particular social group." n88 For example, the BIA declined to pass judgment on whether members of the 1980 Mariel Freedom Flotilla that left Cuba and arrived at Key West, Florida, constituted a particular social group. n89 The BIA avoided the issue by rejecting the Cubans' asylum applications on other grounds. n90 In reviewing the BIA decision in that case, Attorney General William French Smith recognized that the board had not articulated a clear definition of particular social group but declined to do so himself. n91
Based on the BIA's subsequent determinations, it would seem that the First Circuit/BIA definition requiring an immutable characteristic is less inclusive than the Ninth Circuit definition. For example, the BIA held that Chinese couples who opposed China's "one child" policy and who faced forced sterilizations were not members of a particular social group. n92 Likewise, the BIA held that Guatemalan women who were victims of domestic violence by their husbands were not part of a cognizable social group. n93 (This decision was later vacated by the Attorney General, who ordered the BIA to reconsider the case in light of a proposed regulation--never adopted in the Code of Federal Regulations--that would have codified in a single rule aspects [*295] of both the First Circuit/BIA definition and the Ninth Circuit definition of particular social group. n94 ) But the BIA has not rejected out of hand all claims about membership in a particular social group. Among individuals the BIA determined to be members of a particular social group were a Cuban homosexual; n95 young women in a particular tribe in northern Togo who were subject to forced female genital mutilation; n96 and members of a Somali clan with "linguistic commonalities." n97 In a 2006 case, the BIA suggested strongly for the first time that, in addition to an immutable characteristic, the determination of one's particular social group status would depend on recognizability or social visibility. n98 The BIA expounded on that requirement a few months later.
In January 2007, at the urging of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the BIA made an effort to further refine its definition of "particular social group." n99 Specifically, the BIA was charged with explaining its determination that "affluent Guatemalans" did not [*296] constitute a particular social group under the INA. The board reviewed its prior cases establishing the "common, immutable characteristic" definition but then stated that the determination of such a characteristic was not dispositive. n100 The board further explained two factors alluded to but not emphasized in prior decisions: (1) social visibility and (2) particularity. n101 In doing so, the BIA essentially followed the Second Circuit's lead in its Gomez case. n102
The BIA stated that a group's so-called "social visibility" must be measured against the backdrop of the particular country in question and the particular persecution feared. With respect to affluent Guatemalans fearing extortion or robbery, the board concluded that social visibility was not present because "violence and crime in Guatemala appear to be pervasive at all socio-economic levels." n103 Still, the board noted, wealth could become a shared characteristic of a particular social group if there was evidence that a particular government imprisoned, mistreated or persecuted individuals with assets or income above a certain level. n104 In short, the social visibility factor seems to measure whether society perceives a certain group of individuals to be more likely than others to suffer persecution as a result of their membership in that group. n105 Meanwhile, the "particularity" requirement refers to whether a certain group of individuals is determinate or distinguishable. n106 The group of wealthy Guatemalans was "simply too subjective, inchoate, and variable to provide the sole basis for membership in a particular social group." n107 This was so because there was no way of determining at what point to draw the line between wealth and non-wealth; the board noted that the group of wealthy Guatemalans might constitute as little as 1% or as much as 20% of the entire population. n108 Although the "social visibility" and "particularity" requirements are relatively new and untested, and have not yet been applied either by the BIA or the Page 7 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 279, *293 Courts of Appeals to claims of asylum by journalists, the two new factors may provide hope for international journalists seeking asylum.
[*297] JOURNALISTS' ASYLUM APPLICATIONS IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEAL
In approximately the last decade, the U.S. Courts of Appeal have considered at least thirty cases in which international journalists contended they were entitled to U.S. asylum. n109 In twenty-four of the cases (80%) the intermediate federal appellate courts affirmed denials of asylum. n110 In six cases (20%) the courts reversed, in full or in part, denials [*298] of asylum. n111 Twenty-three of the cases were decided after 2001, when immigration issues took center political stage after terrorist attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C. Although a more complete picture of journalist asylum claims could be provided through analysis of IJ and BIA opinions, the public availability of those decisions is extremely limited, making the courts of appeal opinions the best research option notwithstanding their own limitations. n112
In many of the cases studied, neither immigration officials nor appellate judges considered the merits of whether the journalists involved were indeed members of a particular social group. Instead, asylum applications were sometimes denied based on lack of proof of either subjective persecution or objectively reasonable fear of persecution. For example, a Nigerian radio journalist named Benjamin Agada was denied asylum in the United States despite documented evidence that journalists in Nigeria had been subjected to extra-judicial arrests, kidnappings and slayings during the regime of General Sani Abacha. n113 At a hearing before an immigration judge in 1999, Agada's story was determined to be credible (that is, the subjective element was established), but the IJ nevertheless denied his application for asylum because the judge concluded that conditions in Nigeria had changed sufficiently to allow journalists like Agada to return there without an objectively reasonable fear of persecution. n114
[*299] The Agada case demonstrates the tendency of IJs to discredit information submitted by asylum seekers that might contradict the State Department Country Reports. Agada submitted information gathered by the online Nigerian Media Monitor that suggested journalists were still being persecuted even after General Abacha's death in 1998. The IJ confessed to being unfamiliar with the Nigerian Media Monitor but nonetheless discredited its reports that journalists were still being harmed, in part because the administrative law judge concluded that "the journalists allegedly harmed were injured while attempting to report on dangerous but legitimate uses of police force." n115 Other cases reviewed also demonstrate the relative rarity of a credible subjective story of persecution coinciding with a Country Report documenting such incidents. n116
One of the primary pieces of subjective documentation required by immigration courts is evidence of a non-U.S. journalist's work. Although it seems likely journalists fleeing persecution in their native countries might not have access to their published or broadcast works, some Us place great importance on these pieces of documentary evidence and tend to discredit the stories of applicants who fail to produce them. For example, the Sixth Circuit in 2004 denied a petition for review filed by Guatemalan journalist Luis A. De Leon, largely because De Leon had failed to produce articles he wrote as a journalist. n117 Asylum decisions in other cases also have hinged on [*300] lack of production of published journalistic works. n118 Some applicants who failed to produce journalistic works have been denied asylum notwithstanding harrowing accounts of persecution. n119
The Agada case and others also demonstrate the difficulty under which asylum applicants operate with respect to their appeals in the federal circuit courts. For example, the Sixth Circuit explained that the abuse of discretion standard--generally called the "substantial evidence" standard in the immigration context--meant that the court would have to determine that no reasonable fact finder would have concluded as the IJ and BIA did. n120 Notwithstanding the strong [*301] bias in favor of deferring to the decisions of IJs, particularly with respect to credibility determinations, some circuit courts have rejected the conclusions of Us that an asylum applicant was indeed credible. n121
For those non-U.S. journalists who overcome subjective and objective evidentiary requirements, credibility determinations in light of scarce evidence of journalistic product, and a limited standard of review on appeal, the Page 8 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 279, *296 chances are better that a panel of circuit judges will find merit in an asylum application. Still, federal circuit judges universally do not view journalists as part of a particular social group in accordance with the statutory requirements for asylum. No case studied involved an explicit determination that journalists constituted a particular social group. n122 Even the six cases in which journalists successfully petitioned for judicial review of asylum denials did not hinge on particular social group inclusion; instead, those reversals were based on persecution on account of some other statutory ground, such as political opinion or ethnicity.
Journalists and the "Particular Social Group"
Clearly, under existing judicial tests, journalists do not constitute a particular social group for asylum purposes. Although few of the cases studied included explicit rejections of the social group argument (because most asylum applications were rejected on other grounds, such as lack of credibility), no cases explicitly held that journalists are part of a particular social group. Although some journalists may see their work as an important part of who they are, no circuit court even suggested that journalism might be an "immutable characteristic" that one could not change or something "so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed." n123 Thus under the test applied by the BIA and [*302] several circuit courts, including the First Circuit, journalists do not fit the definition of a particular social group.
Under the Ninth Circuit definition in Sanchez-Trujillo, however, journalists might be a slightly better fit in the social group definition. That test focuses on "a voluntary associational relationship ... which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to their identity." n124 Still, not even the Ninth Circuit has held that journalists meet the definition. For example, two members of a three-judge Ninth Circuit panel voted to deny an asylum appeal by a Russian Jewish journalist named Eugueni Bortnikov, who was beaten with a metal pipe because he would not give up a videotape depicting a coup attempt by an anti-Semitic political organization called Pamyat. n125 The court concluded that he was beaten unconscious merely because he possessed the inculpatory videotape and not because he was a journalist; the two-judge majority also held that the group of Russian journalists was "too large and diverse a collection of individuals to qualify as a 'particular social group,'" within the meaning of the Immigration and Nationality Act. n126
Even the dissenter in that case, Judge Richard Paez, did not argue Bortnikov was, as a journalist, a member of a particular social group. Instead, he noted that Bortnikov had voiced his political opposition to Pamyat before he was beaten and that Bortnikov and his family had been the target of religious hate speech; thus the dissent based its conclusion that Bortnikov merited asylum on religious and political persecution. n127 Like Paez, those circuit judges who have looked favorably on journalists' asylum claims have done so not on the basis of journalism but rather political opinion, religion or another statutory ground. Some courts have suggested that journalism is inherently political, at least when it criticizes the performance of government.
Journalism and Political Opinion
It could be argued that persecuted journalists need not seek U.S. asylum protection based on the particular social group ground when they might more easily fit the asylum requirement for persecution [*303] based on political opinion. Although most U.S. journalists might deny their work is politically partisan, n128 there is some evidence in the cases studied to conclude that persecuted international journalists do in fact fit within the realm of political persecution. In a 2000 case, for example, one Ninth Circuit panel held that a Pakistani journalist who was beaten and threatened in his newspaper office by political partisans unhappy with his coverage had been persecuted because of his political opinion. n129 In that case, the panel concluded, Syed Zahid Hussain's twenty years as a newspaper editor at Huriat and later Nawa Iwaqt, both Urdu-language and politically independent newspapers, made clear that " [j] ournalism is work that overtly manifests a political opinion." n130 In 1989, while Hussain worked at the Huriat, more than 100 members of the Mohajir Quami Movement (MQM) attacked the newspaper building, breaking windows with stones and shouting threats. Later that year members of MQM held the newspaper owner hostage and extracted a promise to publish pro-MQM news on the newspaper's front page.
Page 9 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 279, *301 Soon after, the newspaper stopped publishing. Thereafter, Hussain worked at Nawa Iwaqt. In 1991, members of the Punjabi Pakhpoon Intihad (PPI), a political group opposed to MQM, attacked Hussain in the newspaper office. He was detained until editors "ultimately agreed to publish PPI news on the back page of the newspaper." n131 The Ninth Circuit panel concluded that Hussain had been persecuted because PPI members thought he was a supporter of MQM and thus published pro-MQM news. The Ninth Circuit also made the important distinction that being persecuted for one's political opinion involves the persecutors' perceptions of one's political opinion, [*304] not whether the individual being persecuted actually holds the opinion:
[A]lthough Hussain believed that he was making politically-independent decisions when he decided what news to publish, the PPI believed that articles in the Nawa Iwaqt favored the MQM. Persecution because of an imputed political opinion, even if the petitioner does not actually hold that opinion, is a valid basis for asylum. n132 This seems particularly pertinent to journalist asylum cases because even if journalists see themselves as objective and non-political, their persecutors might not. In a 2004 case, the Ninth Circuit drew the distinction that journalists' work to expose corruption was in fact a political statement, even though no particular political view might be espoused, as long as the journalists attempted to uncover systemic corruption as opposed to merely episodic corruption that might relate only to a single individual in political power. n133 In that case, Hasan v. Ashcroft, the court granted a petition for review filed by a journalist from Bangladesh, primarily because the panel concluded that the IJ erred in concluding that the persecution of the journalist was not due to political opinion.
Afroza Hasan worked as a reporter for Purnima, a local newspaper in Bangladesh. She primarily wrote about women's issues and was active in Mohila Parishad, an organization that served women in crisis. She was also a member of the political party BNP, or Bangladesh Nationalist Party. n134 In 1995, Hasan wrote an article critical of an associate of Abu Jaher, a local political and union leader. Jaher and his associate were members of the Awami League, a national political party in opposition to the BNP Soon after publication of the article, Hasan was approached by the Jaher associate she wrote about and two other individuals, who threatened to "break my hand" and burn her with acid. n135 [*305] Hasan was subsequently attacked numerous times, including more than once in a single night at her home. The attackers, who were identified as associates of Abu Jaher, or the "Chairman," ransacked Hasan's apartment and then broke into her parents' apartment, where they beat her father. Additionally, the attackers located Hasan's husband, who was hiding in a car, and beat him with sticks until he was unconscious. They eventually chased Hasan herself, causing her to fall and be injured, and they set fire to her bedroom. n136 The next day Purnima published an account of these events, and the Chairman subsequently issued a wanted-style poster accusing Hasan of engaging in "anti-Islamic activities." n137
Hasan and her husband entered the United States on six-month visas in 1999 and overstayed the visa period. The INS initiated removal proceedings; meanwhile, in Bangladesh, the Chairman's thugs had told Hasan's father that " [t]he day your daughter will land in ... Bangladesh that will be her last day." n138 The Ninth Circuit eventually concluded that Hasan's work to expose corruption through the popular press was in fact a political statement. n139 The court wrote:
The text of the article provided in the record reveals that, contrary to the IJ's characterization, Afroza did more than call the Chairman a "crook." She accused him of organizing a cadre of "terrorism, repression, and extortion," of "misappropriation of public money," of "collect[ing] tolls for his own while giving hookup connection[s] for water and gas lines," and of making his political office "an office of corruption." These are indisputably political issues. n140 The panel concluded that Hasan's articles related not to a mere "personal vendetta" against the Chairman; instead, the panel suggested that a journalist who attempts to write about widespread corruption in government is engaging in an activity that is "by its very [*306] nature, political." n141 In all, five of the six journalists who succeeded on asylum Page 10 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 279, *303 appeals in the cases studied did so because of persecution based on their political opinions; n142 the other case involved an Eritrean journalist who was fired from his Ethiopian government job and persecuted because of his ethnicity. n143 While the Ninth Circuit has been outspoken in concluding that journalists' work is inherently political, at least two other circuits have denied petitions for review by journalists seeking asylum after exposing corruption. In 1999, the Sixth Circuit denied the asylum application of well-known Bulgarian journalist and author Jordan Gantchovski. n144 The Court stated that even if Gantchovski was in danger of being harmed by those opposed to his investigatory work on the murder of anti-Communist author George Markov, he was not entitled to asylum because he was merely wrapped up in a nasty personal dispute rather than persecution based on politics or membership in a particular social group. n145
[*307] Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit in 1997 denied a petition for review filed by Oscar Garcia, a Guatemalan radio journalist who had spoken out against the illegal drug trade. n146 As a result, he received threats and was subject to an assassination attempt by drug dealers. He was unconscious for several days after a drug dealer's car intentionally rammed him head-on. However, he was denied asylum by the IJ and BIA, who found his story not to be credible, and the Tenth Circuit stated that even if Garcia was the target of retaliation and violence by drug dealers, this persecution was not necessarily the result of his political opinion and thus asylum was not merited. n147 However, journalists who do not qualify for asylum on the basis of persecution for political opinion might return to the social group membership argument in light of the BIA's new interpretation of the definition of that term. n148 the BIA for the first time articulated the "social visibility" and "particularity" requirements within the definition of particular social group. Although future adjudications may refine these factors, social visibility seems to focus on whether members of a particular society perceive a certain social group as more likely targets of persecution than the general population. n149 Meanwhile, particularity involves the distinctiveness of a particular group. n150
Social Visibility and Particularity

In its January 2007 opinion in In re A-M-E & J-G-U,
Although somewhat speculative at this point, a conclusion seems reasonable that journalists might be able to make more headway with the new BIA factors than under the old BIA/First Circuit test for particular social group. Although it may not be possible to say conclusively whether state-sanctioned persecution of journalists has increased [*308] in recent years, recent conflicts in Iraq and other parts of the world have increased public awareness of the dangers of journalistic work. According to one press advocacy group, 93 journalists have been killed in Iraq since 2003. n151 The Committee to Protect Journalists' 2006 summary report "Attacks on the Press" documented several pieces of recent evidence indicating that persecution of journalists has entered the public consciousness: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez threatened to pull broadcasters' licenses after accusing them of trying to divide the nation; Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a measure including slander of public officials within the definition of extremism or terrorism; and the Israeli government announced that journalists would be targeted if driving in southern Lebanon. n152 In short, in many societies, the public is likely aware that journalists constitute a specific group of people that faces unique dangers and, possibly, persecutions. This might favor journalists arguing they are part of a socially visible group under the meaning of the BIA's 2007 In re A-M-E & J-G-U case. In the federal circuit asylum cases studied, even though the new BIA factors were not yet in place, there is some evidence that circuit judges considered journalists to be part of a socially visible group. For example, a Haitian broadcast journalist named Lamonste Jean Baptiste claimed he was attacked in December 1998 by members of Lavalas, the party of former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide, after reporting on an opposition press conference. n153 In an attempt to discredit him, the U.S. Justice Department obtained a document from the Haitian Embassy claiming that Baptiste was "not well known" as a journalist in Haiti and he "did not have political problems" there. n154
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ultimately reversed a decision by the BIA that the document undermined Baptiste's credibility; the court reasoned that the Haitian Embassy document actually supported his claims because it showed that Baptiste did indeed work as a radio journalist in Haiti. The Second Circuit noted that "[t]he Page 11 12 Comm. L. & Pol'y 279, *306 Human Rights Watch report in the record confirmed that members of the press were frequently targeted in Haiti, and did not suggest that attacks were limited to the most [*309] prominent journalists." n155 Thus, the court provided support for the proposition that journalists generally, even if not particularly famous as individuals, are part of a socially visible group that might become targets for government persecution. n156 Still, the bigger hurdle might be BIA's new particularity requirement, given that distinguishing or defining journalists would not be an easy task. Although beyond the scope of this article, the question of who may be defined as a journalist has been much discussed in the last several years as part of the larger debate about whether journalists are entitled to a privilege not to disclose confidential sources in legal proceedings. n157 Although the issue remains unresolved in the United States, at least, two things have become clear: first, defining journalists is very difficult; and, second, government efforts to define journalists raise constitutional free-expression concerns. n158 At least in some countries, however, requirements for or regulations on journalists that would seem unconstitutional under the First Amendment might actually help define journalists for the purpose of the BIA's particularity requirement in the asylum context. For example, in more than a dozen Latin American countries, including [*310] Costa Rica and Venezuela, there has long been a legal requirement that journalists belong to a colegio, or professional association. n159 Functionally, then, journalists in those countries are easy to distinguish by virtue of the simple check of whether they have met the requirements to become members of the colegio. Under one colegio system representative of others, all journalists had to join the association and abide by a certain code of ethics or they could be forbidden from the profession. n160 In the cases studied, federal circuit judges seemed willing to allow journalist asylum seekers to define themselves, as long as there was some evidence in the form of stories published or broadcast segments produced. n161 This view is in line with that of commentators who have argued immigration authorities should defer to the self-definition of asylum seekers. n162 The most common sought-after verification by circuit judges were copies of journalistic work, n163 but some judges suggested other items, such as newspaper employment records, might have been enough. n164 One court, though, was not persuaded by a class ring showing that an asylum seeker was once a journalism major. n165 Interestingly, some IJs seem to impose a higher-than-normal burden [*311] of articulation on journalists, who presumably have spent their professional lives telling stories and thus should be able to relate clearly their own persecution stories. n166 Overall, there is no certainty yet that journalists seeking asylum will succeed in persuading IJs, the BIA and appellate judges that they are, in fact, members of particular social group because their profession has "social visibility" and "particularity." These factors have yet to be applied extensively by the BIA and the appellate courts, and, thus, it is not yet clear how expansive they will be in including potential social groups such as journalists. Still, based on a close reading and the little available evidence, it seems the new BIA factors will expand somewhat the definition of particular social group.
CONCLUSION
The thirty journalist asylum cases surveyed provide only a small picture of the realities of asylum, although they do represent the readily available federal circuit cases involving asylum claims by non-U.S. journalists. Future research could explore further the treatment of non-U.S. journalists in the U.S. asylum system and continue to analyze whether that treatment is appropriate. Still, it appears journalists are particularly vulnerable to persecution because the nature of their work is to investigate and write about issues that tend to make government officials unhappy, if not violent. Particularly when they cover official corruption, journalists place themselves at risk of persecution of a type that may not be accounted for in the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act.
Of thirty relatively recent federal circuit cases involving asylum applications by non-U.S. journalists, denials of asylum were upheld in twenty-four cases and reversed in only six cases. It is unknown how many non-U.S. journalists during this time might have gained asylum approval through either an affirmative or defensive application. In case of a Page 12grant of asylum, the applicant would have no reason to file a petition for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals, and thus no record of the case would appear in the federal circuit databases. To find grants of asylum to journalists, research would have to focus on [*312] decisions of Us and the BIA, most of which are not published in readily available databases. Even then, affirmative applications granted by an asylum officer would not be discovered.
Notwithstanding the relatively small number of cases covered and problems documenting the entire universe of journalist asylum claims, it is clear that the federal courts do not consider journalists members of a "particular social group" under the Immigration and Nationality Act. Still, some circuit court judges have concluded that journalists' work, particularly when it involved investigation of systemic government corruption, was inherently political and thus provided grounds for asylum under the INA. Congress, the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice should be particularly sensitive to the merits of journalists' asylum claims. Whether described as persecution based on political opinion or social group membership, the targeting of journalists who work to uncover and publicize official corruption should be recognized as a basis on which asylum may be granted.
However, given the current U.S. climate regarding immigration, it seems unlikely that any political actors will be willing to take action that would be perceived to be "soft" on illegal immigrants. While perhaps somewhat understandable, the post-September 11 anti-immigrant sentiment has had real consequences for individuals and families. Particularly when it comes to U.S. attempts to promote democracy abroad, neither administration goals nor individual interests are served by removing from the United States non-U.S. journalists who already have experienced that their efforts to be catalysts for change in their countries will be met with strong opposition and, sometimes, government-sanctioned violence. In the end, the United States' failure to see the value of accommodating journalist asylum seekers will only have a negative effect on the U.S. interests of promoting democracy and protecting national security.
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